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Capturing the role of societal affinity in cross-border mergers with the Eurovision Song Contest 
  
 
Abstract 
This paper demonstrates the effectiveness of voting bias in the Eurovision Song Contest as a 
means of capturing societal affinity. More than 180 million viewers from more than 40 countries 
watch the Eurovision Song Contest every year and vote for their favorite songs. Societal affinity 
between participating countries leads to systematic bias in voting patterns as each song represents a 
country. Using cross-border mergers as a proxy for international business exchanges, we demonstrate 
how voting bias provides a simple, freely available, and dynamic means of capturing societal affinity 
between countries that complements other metrics of affinity and distance. 
Keywords: Eurovision Song Contest; Societal Affinity; Cross-Border Mergers. 
JEL classification: G1; G34; Z1.
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INTRODUCTION 
Taking inspiration from the body of literature that examines the information content of voting 
bias observable within the Eurovision Song Contest (e.g., Yair, 2018), we present voting bias in the 
Eurovision Song Contest as a measure of societal affinity. We propose that societal affinity within 
pairs of countries (dyads) is imperfectly correlated with distance arising from geography, economic 
factors, and culture. Unlike distance, societal affinity can take negative as well as neutral and positive 
values.  
Each May, participating countries submit their song to the contest and the public votes to 
determine the best original song, and hence the winning country. Artists who started their career at the 
Eurovision Song Contest include ABBA, Celine Dion, and Julio Iglesias. Approximately 180 million 
viewers watch the contest and over 10 million votes are cast every year. However, the competition is 
often regarded as severely biased due to consistent voting patterns within dyads such as Cyprus and 
Greece, or Ireland and the UK. For example, the veteran Irish journalist, Terry Wogan, declared that 
the Eurovision Song Contest is no longer a musical contest (Peterkin, 2008). Voting for a favorite 
song is primarily a system-one cognitive process (Kahneman, 2011). Votes are driven by inner 
subconscious beliefs but modified by social interactions with associates and preconceptions about the 
nations represented by each song. There is no obviously right or wrong answer. The stakes are also 
low enough to discount the possibility that respondents are overly analytical or self-conscious when 
casting their vote. 
We test our proposition using cross-border mergers as a proxy for international business (IB) 
exchanges. In line with our prediction, more mergers occur between countries having greater societal 
affinity. Our finding that societal affinity moderates the effects of distance complements distance 
measures commonly used in IB research (e.g., Beugelsdijk, Kostova & Roth, 2017; Dinner, 
Kushwaha & Steenkamp, 2019). 
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SOCIETAL AFFINITY 
Although societal affinity influences human decisions in ways not captured by traditional 
distance studies, societal affinity has received relatively little attention in IB research. To redress this, 
we show its relevance for IB by hypothesizing that the number of cross-border mergers within country 
dyads is positively associated with societal affinity. Societal affinity is related with familiarity in the 
sense of an uncritical link of togetherness, such as sharing language or religion. Although some 
studies examine the relationship between familiarity and managers’ decisions (e.g., Clark, Li & 
Shepherd, 2018), familiarity and affinity differ in that familiarity may also lead to contempt (Norton, 
Frost & Ariely, 2007). 
Several factors potentially determine the level of affinity towards a country. For example, 
media coverage should have a relatively homogenous influence on citizens’ affinity within dyadic 
pairs. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, storms, fires and wars could also influence the affinity of 
a large percentage of citizens of one country for citizens of another country. Likewise, school 
curricula may influence young peoples’ affinity for a country (e.g., Barton & McCully, 2005) and 
these feelings are likely to persist later in life. The driver of decisions taken due to societal affinity is 
not necessarily subconscious or irrational. For example, countries that share similar cultures may have 
fewer synergies and complementarities leading some corporate managers to engage their firms with 
counterparts in psychically distant countries to benefit from diversity (Shenkar, 2012).  
Our model of societal affinity characterized by Exhibit 1, goes beyond standard distance 
metrics by capturing the degree to which characteristics are liked and sympathized, both by actors 
who share them, and those who do not, i.e. the attraction of opposites. We posit that, in and of itself, 
closeness is an insufficient condition to enable the initiation and development of information 
exchange networks that facilitate the high value knowledge exchange described by the revised 
Uppsala Process model (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Instead we argue that affinity is an important 
moderator of distance that influences human decisions. Whether in marriage, corporate mergers, or 
international relations, in the absence of affinity, it is hard to conceive of the trusting committed 
relationship development necessary for the sharing of valuable or sensitive information.  
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Insert Exhibit 1 about here 
The upper left quadrant of Exhibit 1 – represents situations in which psychic proximity, ease 
of communication, mutual understanding, recognition, appreciation and sympathy enable psychically 
close societies to like each other more than distant ones. One’s level of sympathy can also be 
influenced by the closeness of minds and emotions, familiarity, the feeling of intimacy, perceiving 
something in another that is in common with oneself, and any bodily similarity (Sally, 2000). 
Countries that share the same language, religion, history, and a geographical border, or whose capitals 
are relatively close, are expected to share a high level of societal affinity.  
The upper right quadrant of Exhibit 1, is characterized by dyadic relations such as those 
between Japan and the UK, two countries that, appear psychically distant, both in geography and 
culture (for example, uncertainty avoidance and individualism). Yet both countries share high levels 
of societal affinity having benefitted from exchanges, among others, in whisky distilling, 
manufacturing, sports, film, manga and music. 
Continuing clockwise to the bottom right quadrant of Exhibit 1, Arikan & Shenkar (2013) 
find that the probability of forming an alliance decreases within country dyads that share animosity 
and fear. Such dyads typically have a history of conflict, thus making business exchanges costly and 
subject to liability of foreignness. Examples include the US and Iran, or the US and China (e.g. 
Huawei).  
The bottom left quadrant of Exhibit 1 indicates that closeness may reduce transaction costs 
and transport costs. Still, close entities are also liable to hostile rivalry, especially if states or regions 
have engaged in armed conflict in the past. Greece and Turkey, are two countries for which one may 
expect a close interrelation, yet societal affinity within this dyad is low. Indeed, most distance metrics 
predict significant cross-border activity between Greece and Turkey, whereas our societal affinity 
measure predicts the reverse. 
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METHODS 
Key Independent Variable – Societal Affinity 
 We estimated OLS regressions focusing on the significance of societal affinity (voting bias) 
for IB exchanges. Following Charron (2013), we represent societal affinity as the average voting 
score received between each pair of countries in the Eurovision Song Contest, after subtracting the 
average score received across all remaining countries for the songs associated with each pair, in order 
to control for the quality of a song. If the bias is zero between two countries, a population’s vote is 
determined purely by the universal appeal of the song. Voting bias reflects the societal affinity 
stemming from general relations between two countries. In other words, voting populations prefer bad 
songs from a country with which they share affinity to good songs from a country with which they 
share antipathy. Our main independent variable is thus societal affinity as measured by voting bias. 
Our sample begins in 1999 because prior to then, songs were ranked by national judges only. Voting 
records for the period 1999 through 2013 were accessed from the official Eurovision website 
(Eurovision Song Contest, 2019). The votes available are 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 12; therefore, 
the voting bias can vary between minus 12 and plus 12. The sample includes the 41 countries shown 
in the Online Appendix. The results indicate some typical voting patterns; for example, on average, 
participants in Greece and Cyprus award marks between themselves that are 7.21 points higher than 
the marks given to them by citizens in other countries.  
Dependent Variable – Cross-Border Mergers 
Cross-border mergers offer an ideal experiment in which to study IB exchanges because of 
the extensive number of determinants that are already established in the literature (e.g., Erel, Liao & 
Weisbach, 2012). We explore whether societal affinity matters after controlling for a large number of 
such determinants. Our hypothesis states that other things being equal, more cross-border mergers will 
occur between countries that share societal affinity relative to those that do not. Our dependent 
variable (Ln number of Mergers) is the natural logarithm of one plus the average number of cross-
border merger deals per dyad in the full period. We obtained data from Thomson OneBanker and the 
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total number of deals in our sample is 13,344. As expected, we find that the number of merger deals is 
especially pronounced within target and bidder firms headquartered in the UK (3,725), France 
(2,934), and Germany (1,341) (details available from the authors). There are 784 country pairs 
(dyads) in our sample. 
Other Independent Variables 
We explore whether voting bias explains merger activity after adjusting for other distance 
proxies. From the Hofstede website (Hofstede Insights, 2019) we collect: power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence. We also 
used harmony, embeddedness, hierarchy, mastery, affective autonomy, intellectual autonomy, and 
egalitarianism, to create the Schwartz culture distance measures (Schwartz, 2008); plus trust, 
authority, and individualism to estimate distance using the World Values Survey (World Values 
Survey, 2019). In line with Kogut and Singh (1988) and Beugelsdijk, Ambos and Nell (2018), we 
standardized culture distance between dyads.  
We control for characteristics that indicate similarities among populations (e.g., Feito-Ruiz & 
Menendez-Requejo, 2011). These include the percentage of citizens speaking each other’s language 
within in a dyad (Shared Language), and whether countries within a dyad share a primary religion, 
and legal origin. If two countries share the same characteristic, the dummy variable is equal to one; 
they need to be interpreted the opposite way to variables measuring distance or difference. Our 
method of identifying primary religion is based on Stulz and Williamson (2003). We used the CIA 
World Factbook (CIA, 2019) to identify the percentage of citizens who speak different languages in a 
country and to identify firms’ legal origin, i.e. civil law, common law, or both civil and common law. 
We used the International Historical Statistics database to access the history of a country, and use a 
dummy variable that equals one as a control for when countries share a history within dyads. For 
example, in the case of Ireland it is stated that “the 26 counties of southern Ireland became the Irish 
Free State, an independent dominion of the British Crown with internal self-government, in 1921. Full 
independence was achieved in 1949” (Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2013, pp.32). Therefore, the United 
Kingdom and Ireland share history. Our continuous variable, Conflicts, measures the number of 
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conflicts with at least one fatality per country dyad between 1821 and 2010 and recoded in the 
Correlates of War dataset (Correlates of War, 2019). 
We determined the interest shown for each song using data from the Google Trends website 
(Google Trends, 2019). If people wish to hear a song again, they are likely to search for it online. 
Therefore, our measure, Song Familiarity, is a continuous variable measuring the number of years that 
Google search activity peaked at the maximum (100) for a country’s song between one day before and 
three days after each competition in at least one country within each dyad. Some song names such as 
“believe me” or “love song” are noisy to the extent that many people may Google such terms without 
necessarily searching for the song in question. In order to ensure that we capture search activity for 
our songs we restricted the songs’ familiarity in Google searches to equal 100 around the competition.  
We controlled for geographic country characteristics using kilometers of shared border. We 
further controlled for the distance in kilometers between capital cities, since shorter distances are 
associated with more cross-border mergers (e.g., Ahern, Daminelli & Fracassi, 2015), and for whether 
countries are in the same region (i.e. Northern Europe, Middle East) using a dummy. The 
geographical data are available from the CIA World Factbook.  
Variables based on economic characteristics are known to influence merger activity (e.g., Erel 
et al., 2012). For example, large differences of corporate taxation within dyads (e.g., Huizinga & 
Voget, 2009). Hence, we downloaded taxation levels from the WorldBank (WorldBank, 2019). We 
also used a dummy variable, to capture pairs of countries that adopted the Euro because eliminating 
exchange rate risk is likely to facilitate cross-border mergers, since there is no uncertainty on 
exchange rate movement. Economic output is controlled for by taking the natural logarithm of the 
average GDP per capita per country dyad (Ln GDP). More mergers are expected within dyads 
exhibiting high levels of economic development (e.g., Dinc & Erel, 2013). We also controlled for the 
absolute distance of GDP per capita within dyads by taking the log of the absolute difference in GDP 
per capita using World Bank data. Small differences in GDP indicate similar stages of economic 
development, and therefore more likelihood of cross-border mergers. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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Some Empirical Validation of our Societal Affinity Construct 
The Pearson correlations between our variables reported in Table 1 provide some validation 
for the use of voting bias as a measure of societal affinity, because distance measures derived from 
Hofstede and Schwartz, together with capitals distance are negatively related with voting bias. Also, 
voting bias is positively correlated with the length of a shared border between countries. Participants 
that share the same history, the same religion, or the same region also exhibit a high level of voting 
bias. We find no relation between voting bias and song familiarity, indicating that voting bias does not 
reflect music preferences. This result is not surprising considering that the UK music industry is one 
of the most dominant globally, but UK songs commonly receive relatively few votes in the Eurovision 
Song Contest.  
To avoid multicollinearity in our estimations in line with Lee and Makhija (2009), we 
orthogonalized variables with an absolute correlation higher than 0.5. These variables are (i) shared 
region, capitals distance and shared border distance, (ii) GDP and GDP difference, and (iii) distance 
from values taken in the Hofstede and WVS data sets. We find that conclusions of the results reported 
are unchanged even without orthogonalizing these variables (details available from the authors).   
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Determinants of Cross-Border Mergers 
Column (1) of Table 2 reports bivariate relations between cross-border mergers, voting bias 
and conventional distance measures, while columns (2) to (6) report the multivariate findings. We 
report results for the different culture distance metrics separately in columns (2), (3) and (4). Because 
the WVS’s cultural distance measure has a substantial number of missing values, we report results 
without and with WVS in columns (5) and (6), respectively.   
Insert Table 2 about here 
In line with our hypothesis, high voting bias (high societal affinity) is associated with more 
cross-border mergers, while high cultural distance captured by Hofstede and Schwartz values are 
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associated with fewer cross-border mergers. The WVS’s measure is not significant, perhaps due to the 
relatively small number of observations available within our sample. The bivariate results demonstrate 
that coefficients for most of the controls are in line with prior research (e.g., Erel et al., 2012).   
In line with our hypothesis, the relation between voting bias and mergers is remarkably 
consistent across different multivariate model specifications, in some of which, the other distance 
measures are subsumed. A one-unit increase in voting bias is associated with 16.5% increase in the 
number of cross-border mergers after controlling for other determinants in column (5), so the relation 
is economically significant.  
Explanatory Power of the Determinants  
The explanatory power (R-squared) of the determinants of the number of cross-border 
mergers are reported in column (1) of Table 3 for each of our determinants separately. Columns (2) 
and (3) report the incremental R-squared for the determinants in excess of the combined R-squared 
when all the other variables are included together in the same model.  
Voting bias explains 4.4% of the variation in the number of cross-border mergers in a 
bivariate analysis, and 2.5% and 2.8% using a multivariate model estimated with and without the 
WVS, respectively. The explanatory power of voting bias is significant to at least the 5% level. It is 
sixth in terms of explanatory power out of the 17 determinants among the bivariate results, and it is 
second and fourth among the multivariate results in columns (2) and (3), respectively. Song 
familiarity, Ln GDP difference, and % shared language are some of the most consistent factors for 
explaining cross-border merger variation.   
Voting Bias for Each Side of a Country Pair Separately 
Distance metrics are normally only available as an average across each country pair and 
(Shenkar, 2012), so cultural distance measures exhibit an illusion of symmetry in distance between 
countries. We therefore performed a bidirectional test for each dyad to demonstrate the added value of 
voting bias. For example, we find that bias is 9.83 from Cyprus to Greece and 10.84 from Greece to 
Cyprus (available from the authors). 
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Insert Table 4 about here 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 show the results with and without the use of voting bias in 
order to explore the additional explanatory power of voting bias. We find that voting bias explains 
0.3% of the additional variation in the number of cross-border mergers. This level is lower than the 
one reported earlier in Table 3, but is still significant at the 5% level. It is harder to explain the 
variation in the number of cross-border mergers per direction of each country pair, and as a result, the 
total adjusted R-squared values decrease to 28% from around 40% reported in Table 2.  
As a placebo test, Column (4) reports results estimated by reversing the direction of voting 
bias so that the voting bias is from country i to country x when the cross-border mergers is actually 
from country x to country i. The relation between voting bias and the number of cross-border mergers 
in the placebo test is insignificant as expected.  
DISCUSSION 
Our study has significant implications for future academic research, for businesses and for 
policymakers evaluating cross-border mergers. The measure developed in this study complements 
existing distance metrics by highlighting the significance of societal affinity and identifying a freely 
available measure using Eurovision Song Contest voting bias that is updated annually. Our measure 
can be estimated separately for each side of each country pair to explore asymmetries in societal 
affinity. We can test societal affinity over its full range, offering a broad picture of its importance 
relative to prior affinity research.  
An alternative and highly cited index of societal affinity is constructed by Gartzke (1998) 
using country pairwise correlations of roll call voting at the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA). However, it is a measure of affinity between political leaders. In contrast, our study derives 
societal affinity from systematic biases in the reactions of millions of citizens of countries 
participating in the Eurovision Song Contest. Our measure is thus a more visceral and a more 
representative measure of societal affinity within dyads than the Gartzke measure. Other affinity 
metrics include surveys from a small number of countries (e.g., Tims & Miller, 1986; Roth & Romeo, 
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1992; Nes, Yelkur & Silkoset, 2014). Standardized measurement of societal affinity becomes 
challenging, given that terms such as familiarity, similarity and affinity are typically used 
interchangeably. In fact, other methods typically used to capture distance metrics are susceptible to 
sampling, and respondent biases and may themselves be influenced by the culture of the respondent 
(Harzing, 2006). Additionally, many sampling questions require respondents to think about their 
beliefs and values prior to survey completion. 
Although voting bias data are not currently available in some regions such as the Americas, 
the only eligibility criteria for participating in the Eurovision Song Contest is that a country is a 
member of the European Broadcasting Union and that it broadcasts the competition in the current year 
and the previous year. Indeed, a number of the countries included in our sample are non-European: 
Australia competed in the contest from 2015 onwards. Furthermore, the contest was broadcast in the 
US in 2016 hinting that it too may take part in future competitions. Since the first contest in 1956, the 
number of participating countries has increased from seven to 43 in 2018. Therefore the scope of this 
dataset is expanding all the time. 
No data are available on the demographics of citizens voting in the competition. However, it 
is likely that a significant percentage of voters are relatively young citizens. Young people are the 
ideal age-group to identify a country’s culture because it is in the early formative stages of our lives 
that cultural identifications and perceptions are formed that tend to persist in later life (Chatman & 
Flynn 2001).   
For a robustness test, we used instrumental variables, such as the language used to sing a 
song, the position taken by each country in previous competitions, and the sequence in which a 
country’s song appears in the competition, to investigate the possibility of reverse causality. We find 
that voting bias remains significant when we use these instrumental variables (details available from 
the online appendix). Nonetheless, it is not possible to fully eliminate the possibility of reverse 
causality in which merger activity influences a population’s perception of another country, and hence 
influences voting patterns in the Eurovision Song Contest. Therefore, future studies using our measure 
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of societal affinity, may benefit from applying a two-stage least square analysis to examine this issue, 
in line with Salomon and Shaver (2005).      
CONCLUSION 
We argue that societal affinity between countries facilitates IB exchanges. We then 
demonstrate the effectiveness of voting bias in the Eurovision Song Contest as a means of capturing 
societal affinity. Unlike distance, societal affinity can be either negative – reflecting animosity, or 
positive – reflecting affinity. Furthermore, societal affinity is imperfectly correlated with other 
distance metrics with the result that some dyads of distant countries share high affinity, while some 
dyads of ‘close’ countries share animosity.  
When we use cross-border mergers as a proxy for IB exchanges, we find a positive relation 
between societal affinity and mergers. In line with our hypothesis, more (less) cross-border mergers 
take place when the relative voting bias is high (low). Our evidence thus demonstrates that voting bias 
(societal affinity) captures information that is not contained within standard measures of distance. An 
increasing number of countries are participating in the Eurovision Song Contest and it provides a 
large amount of freely available data, hence we present voting bias as a valuable instrument for future 
research in IB. 
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Exhibit 1 Theoretical schema – Societal affinity versus similarity and distance 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation matrix 
 Mean S.D  1 2 3 4 5 
1 Ln Number of Mergers 1.23 1.50       
2 Voting Bias -1.02 2.12  0.21     
3 Cultural Distance - Hofstede 2.04 1.22  -0.14 -0.24    
4 Cultural Distance - Schwartz 2.28 1.37  -0.15 -0.21 0.11   
5 Cultural Distance - WVS 2.38 2.54  0.11 -0.19 0.61 0.09  
6 Ln Shared Border Distance 0.52 1.69  0.19 0.35 -0.22 -0.20 -0.15 
7 Ln Capitals Distance 7.29 0.65  -0.20 -0.39 0.24 0.29 0.17 
8 Song Familiarity 2.07 1.98  0.41 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.16 
9 Shared Language 1.10 7.81  0.17 0.30 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 
10 Shared Religion 0.16 0.37  0.23 0.18 -0.22 -0.31 -0.20 
11 Shared Legal Origin 0.77 0.42  0.00 -0.04 -0.14 -0.03 0.08 
12 Shared History 0.06 0.24  0.23 0.19 -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 
13 Shared Region 0.09 0.29  0.08 0.31 -0.31 -0.20 -0.20 
14 Conflicts 0.04 0.29  0.10 0.12 -0.10 -0.01 -0.06 
15 Tax Difference 7.26 5.44  -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.10 
16 Shared Currency 0.20 0.40  0.25 0.12 -0.16 -0.06 -0.05 
17 Ln GDP 13.34 1.66  0.24 -0.06 0.16 0.02 0.28 
18 Ln GDP Difference 13.44 1.99  0.14 -0.06 0.12 0.07 0.24 
 
 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
7 -0.52            
8 0.11 -0.01           
9 0.39 -0.22 0.05          
10 0.27 -0.30 0.06 0.13         
11 0.17 -0.21 0.04 0.04 0.02        
12 0.44 -0.23 0.16 0.33 0.11 0.07       
13 0.39 -0.50 0.03 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.23      
14 0.21 -0.15 0.11 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.17 0.09     
15 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 -0.19 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01    
16 0.08 -0.04 0.10 0.13 0.14 -0.08 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.00   
17 0.10 -0.01 0.23 0.05 -0.04 0.15 0.16 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 -0.06  
18 0.10 0.00 0.19 0.06 -0.05 0.11 0.13 -0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.88 
Notes: S.D is the standard deviation, with data combined across the years for each dyad apart from culture distance measures 
derived from Hofstede, Schwartz and WVS values with 470, 434 and 218 dyads respectively. Bold indicates Pearson 
correlation coefficients that are significant at p < 0.01. 
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Table 2 Determinants of cross-border mergers 
         Ln Number of Mergers 
 
Bivariate 
Results 
Multivariate Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Voting Bias 0.147 0.111  0.148 0.092   0.165 0.179  
 (0.000)    (0.002)    (0.000)    (0.012)    (0.001)    (0.017)    
Cultural Distance - 
Hofstede -0.177  -0.100    -0.129   -0.127 
 (0.003)    (0.045)      (0.033)    (0.403)    
Cultural Distance - 
Schwartz -0.182   -0.057  -0.066 0.180 
 (0.002)     (0.280)     (0.303)    (0.056)    
Cultural Distance - WVS 0.065   0.054  0.088 
 (0.105)      (0.188)     (0.614)    
Ln Shared Border 
Distance 0.169 -0.01 -0.062 -0.016 0.000 0.290   
 (0.000)    (0.865)    (0.439)    (0.862)    (0.999)    (0.036)    
Ln Capitals Distance -0.455 -0.207  -0.117 -0.000 -0.166   -0.100 
 (0.000)    (0.003)    (0.131)    (0.999)    (0.046)    (0.481)    
Song Familiarity 0.310 0.348 0.294 0.236 0.335 0.323 
 (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
Shared Language 0.032 0.027 0.014 -0.027   0.022 -0.062 
 (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.173)    (0.012)    (0.001)    (0.000)    
Shared Religion 0.913 0.489   0.487   0.650   0.334 0.180 
 (0.000)    (0.010)    (0.017)    (0.021)    (0.136)    (0.622)    
Shared Legal Origin -0.015 -0.274 -0.261 0.073 -0.706  n/a 
 (0.910)    (0.068)    (0.145)    (0.829)    (0.001)     
Shared History 1.427 0.022 0.228 0.940  -0.039 -0.014 
 (0.000)    (0.941)    (0.446)    (0.007)    (0.910)    (0.975)    
Shared Region 0.437 -0.002 0.056 -0.010 0.006 -0.136 
 (0.054)    (0.985)    (0.560)    (0.903)    (0.953)    (0.336)    
Conflicts 0.510   0.013 0.123 0.083 0.044 0.065 
 (0.035)    (0.954)    (0.618)    (0.739)    (0.872)    (0.832)    
Tax Difference -0.010 -0.012 -0.001 -0.023 0.002 -0.037 
 (0.282)    (0.216)    (0.966)    (0.186)    (0.884)    (0.197)    
Shared Currency 0.944 0.441  0.342   0.783  0.346 0.619 
 (0.000)    (0.003)    (0.037)    (0.006)    (0.056)    (0.063)    
Ln GDP 0.213 0.205  0.258 0.229   0.217   0.150 
 (0.000)    (0.005)    (0.001)    (0.013)    (0.013)    (0.251)    
Ln GDP Difference 0.106 -0.225  -0.146  -0.130 -0.207   -1.015 
 (0.000)    (0.007)    (0.038)    (0.141)    (0.020)    (0.000)    
Constant  1.140 1.293 0.315 1.941 0.924   
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.399)    (0.000)    (0.017)    
N  470 434 218 331 97 
R-squared Adjusted  0.418 0.360 0.370 0.433 0.545 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: This table reports coefficients and significance levels (p-values) in parenthesis on the determinants of cross-border 
mergers. Our dependent variable (Ln Number of Mergers) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of cross-border 
mergers within each dyad of countries. Our main independent variable is the voting bias. Shared Legal Origin’s coefficient 
could not be estimated column 6 (“n/a”) due to there being no variation on data for the particular dyad. N indicates the 
number of country dyads in our sample with data combined across the years within each dyad. 
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Table 3 The explanatory power of the determinants for cross-border mergers  
 Ln Number of Mergers 
  Without WVS With WVS 
 Bivariate  R-squared  R-squared Change R-squared Change 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Voting Bias 0.044 0.025 0.028 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.017) 
Cultural Distance - Hofstede 0.019 0.007 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.033) (0.378) 
Cultural Distance - Schwartz 0.023 0.002 0.018 
 (0.002) (0.303) (0.056) 
Cultural Distance - WVS 0.012  0.002 
 (0.105)  (0.614) 
Ln Shared Border Distance 0.037 0.000 0.031 
 (0.000) (0.999) (0.036) 
Ln Capitals Distance 0.038 0.007 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.046) (0.481) 
Song Familiarity 0.168 0.168 0.157 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Shared Language 0.028 0.011 0.011 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shared Religion 0.051 0.005 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.136) (0.622) 
Shared Legal Origin 0.000 0.020 n/a 
 (0.910) (0.001)  
Shared History 0.053 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.910) (0.975) 
Shared Region 0.007 0.000 0.003 
 (0.054) (0.953) (0.336) 
Conflicts 0.009 0.000 0.000 
 (0.035) (0.872) (0.832) 
Tax Difference 0.001 0.000 0.008 
 (0.282) (0.884) (0.197) 
Shared Currency 0.065 0.008 0.022 
 (0.000) (0.056) (0.063) 
Ln GDP 0.056 0.014 0.007 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.250) 
Ln GDP Difference 0.020 0.018 0.120 
 (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) 
Notes: This table reports the explanatory power and significance levels (p-values) in parenthesis for the determinants of 
cross-border mergers. Column 1 shows the explanatory power of bivariate regressions, while columns 2 and 3 report the 
additional explanatory power of each variable beyond the explanatory power of all other variables together. Our dependent 
variable (Ln Number of Mergers) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of cross-border mergers within country 
dyads. The shared Legal Origin coefficient could not be estimated in column 3 (“n/a”) as there is no variation in the data for 
the particular country dyads. 
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Table 4 The asymmetry effect of voting bias on the number of cross-border mergers 
 Ln Number of Mergers 
 Results with Correct Direction  
Placebo Test – With the 
Wrong Direction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Voting Bias  0.041    0.019 
  (0.011)     (0.218)    
Constant 0.569   0.537  0.554 
 (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000)    
N 1568 1568  1568 
R-squared Adjusted 0.284 0.287  0.284 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
R-squared Change   0.003  
   (0.011)  
Notes: This table reports the coefficients of voting bias per direction per country dyad on cross-border mergers with 
significance levels (p-values) in parenthesis. In (1) we report R – squared adjusted and associated significance levels for the 
controls only without the variable of interest (voting bias), in (2) we report total R – squared adjusted and significance levels, 
while in (3) we report the total R – square change and significance levels when voting bias is added. We include the same 
control variables as in previous estimations (coefficients are available from the authors). We exclude culture dimensions 
from these estimations. 
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Online appendix  
Voting bias 
 Albania Armenia Austria Azerbaijan Belarus Belgium Bosnia Bulgaria 
Armenia -3.80        
Austria 0.11 n/a       
Azerbaijan -3.69 -6.02 -1.77      
Belarus -1.67 0.94 n/a 1.46     
Belgium -2.32 -2.26 -0.24 -3.45 -2.87    
Bosnia 0.29 -4.28 3.27 -2.27 -2.40 -1.71   
Bulgaria n/a -0.15 n/a n/a -6.04 n/a -2.59  
Croatia 0.24 -3.63 1.08 -0.55 n/a -1.44 6.93 n/a 
Cyprus -1.34 0.15 -0.96 1.26 -0.94 -1.23 -2.55 n/a 
Denmark -2.58 -4.00 -0.75 -4.53 -4.77 -0.30 -2.23 n/a 
Estonia -4.24 -2.90 -0.38 -3.27 -1.34 -0.53 -3.05 n/a 
Finland -1.67 -4.22 -0.88 -3.83 -2.50 -0.60 -1.47 -1.96 
France -2.19 2.78 -1.65 -3.65 -2.30 0.48 -0.59 -1.22 
Georgia -3.50 5.90 -2.06 2.99 3.12 -3.07 -3.66 -5.52 
Germany -0.86 -2.43 2.77 -5.03 -3.68 -0.11 -1.12 -2.39 
Greece 5.95 1.21 -2.12 -1.58 -1.88 -0.36 -2.50 6.09 
Hungary -1.20 -3.36 -0.35 -1.51 -3.24 -1.02 -3.39 -0.98 
Iceland -1.56 -2.94 -0.26 -3.72 -1.04 0.32 -2.84 n/a 
Ireland -2.36 -2.69 -1.33 -3.92 -1.74 1.22 -2.54 -3.52 
Israel -1.84 1.21 -1.92 -0.22 2.31 -0.89 -1.72 n/a 
Italy 4.94 -2.82 -2.15 -6.75 -3.48 -0.82 -2.23 n/a 
Latvia -3.68 -4.50 1.29 -2.40 -0.15 0.17 -3.48 -3.54 
Lithuania -2.90 -3.11 -1.75 0.82 1.38 0.44 -2.76 -4.02 
Macedonia 7.11 -2.48 -1.23 -3.38 -1.09 -0.17 3.06 4.39 
Malta -1.18 -1.66 -0.42 1.82 1.32 -2.57 -1.96 n/a 
Moldova -3.30 -1.36 -0.75 1.54 2.79 -2.41 -3.28 -2.13 
Netherlands -2.02 -3.10 -0.19 -5.92 -3.24 6.31 -0.63 n/a 
Norway -2.74 -3.77 -0.16 -3.53 -2.16 -1.07 -0.84 n/a 
Poland -2.16 1.81 0.10 0.60 n/a 0.93 -1.00 n/a 
Portugal -2.32 -2.78 1.89 -4.53 -1.27 -0.95 -2.11 n/a 
Romania -2.24 -2.61 -1.35 -0.62 -3.32 -1.13 -2.88 -1.59 
Russia -3.74 3.84 -1.49 0.80 3.21 -0.84 -3.26 -3.22 
Serbia -1.26 -4.13 0.44 -5.41 -3.08 -3.09 4.70 -2.98 
Slovenia n/a -4.43 0.39 -6.60 -2.50 -1.42 3.89 -1.20 
Spain -2.19 0.64 -0.79 -3.54 -2.33 -0.01 -2.57 0.87 
Sweden -2.10 -2.93 -1.17 -4.52 -3.23 -1.20 -0.22 -4.52 
Switzerland 1.28 -3.46 2.95 -4.48 n/a 2.17 1.67 n/a 
Turkey 2.65 -1.08 1.90 6.14 -4.52 1.36 3.65 -0.17 
Ukraine -3.28 0.64 -3.82 3.85 4.35 -2.14 -3.45 -5.39 
UK -1.57 -2.92 0.45 -3.83 -1.86 -1.50 -2.24 -1.22 
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Continued voting bias 
 Croatia Cyprus Denmark Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece 
Cyprus -1.77         
Denmark -2.30 -1.38        
Estonia -1.88 -1.65 0.16       
Finland -0.71 -0.42 -0.82 3.04      
France -1.21 -1.38 -0.91 -0.46 -0.76     
Georgia -2.13 -0.79 -4.25 -1.51 -1.70 -2.80    
Germany -0.88 -2.35 0.52 -0.83 -0.94 -0.50 -3.81   
Greece -1.04 7.21 -3.56 -1.96 -2.59 -1.38 -1.13 0.08  
Hungary 2.17 -0.57 -2.12 -1.59 2.83 -1.70 -1.57 0.22 -1.24 
Iceland -2.02 0.78 4.78 1.26 3.31 -1.02 -2.80 -0.80 -2.54 
Ireland -0.31 0.23 2.19 1.05 -0.29 -0.82 -2.08 -0.31 -2.96 
Israel -1.61 -0.90 -0.88 -0.32 -1.07 1.97 -0.67 -1.21 -1.84 
Italy n/a 0.32 -2.82 -1.80 -3.17 -0.16 -2.53 -1.13 -0.24 
Latvia -1.37 -3.12 0.31 2.64 -1.70 -1.88 0.80 -0.72 -3.30 
Lithuania -0.54 -0.50 -1.97 0.68 0.39 -0.31 5.26 -2.03 -2.69 
Macedonia 4.31 -1.61 -2.29 -1.44 -2.32 -1.34 -3.17 -1.56 -2.09 
Malta -0.33 0.81 -0.11 -1.18 -1.78 -2.00 -1.84 -1.12 -0.61 
Moldova -2.22 -2.41 -2.59 -1.27 -2.59 -1.75 0.00 -2.76 -2.04 
Netherlands -1.85 -0.26 0.97 0.16 1.48 -0.86 -3.28 -0.40 -2.34 
Norway -2.55 -1.13 2.68 -0.41 0.35 -1.57 -1.86 -1.16 -3.26 
Poland -1.18 -1.23 -1.04 1.09 0.02 0.16 -2.02 3.15 -0.55 
Portugal -0.68 -0.78 -0.64 -1.61 -1.91 4.22 -3.19 0.23 -2.35 
Romania -1.06 -0.77 -1.25 -1.88 -1.49 -0.82 -3.80 -1.82 1.63 
Russia 0.05 -0.21 -3.39 0.83 -1.77 -1.65 0.83 -1.56 -2.09 
Serbia 3.53 -0.05 -4.83 -4.68 -2.23 -0.59 -4.57 -1.62 -1.28 
Slovenia 4.08 -1.05 1.58 0.09 -0.25 -0.64 -3.40 -0.74 -0.66 
Spain -1.14 0.28 -1.17 -1.48 -0.15 0.59 -2.62 0.17 -1.20 
Sweden -2.79 -0.79 3.15 1.82 2.86 -0.93 -3.45 -1.55 -2.59 
Switzerland 2.00 0.64 -1.84 -1.99 -0.32 -1.36 -2.69 2.06 -0.24 
Turkey -0.19 -2.42 -1.48 -2.66 -0.63 1.83 -0.85 2.43 -1.32 
Ukraine -0.98 -1.67 -3.62 -1.36 -3.83 -3.10 3.12 -3.70 -3.12 
UK -1.24 -0.02 -0.19 -0.29 -1.44 -1.04 -2.37 -0.73 0.41 
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Continued voting bias 
 Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Latvia Lithuania Macedonia Malta 
Iceland 2.93         
Ireland -1.74 -0.68        
Israel 2.89 -0.77 -1.12       
Italy -1.80 -2.48 -2.78 n/a      
Latvia -2.35 1.10 0.81 -1.64 n/a     
Lithuania -1.23 -1.14 2.48 -0.34 -0.37 4.38    
Macedonia -2.96 -1.77 -2.22 -1.07 -0.32 -1.74 -2.25   
Malta -1.60 0.09 0.19 -0.79 3.40 -1.80 -0.33 -1.74  
Moldova -2.49 -2.81 -1.31 -1.36 -0.87 -0.26 -1.97 -2.48 -3.04 
Norway 2.28 0.18 0.44 -1.00 -1.13 1.07 -0.90 -2.07 -0.57 
Netherlands -2.92 3.11 -0.30 1.53 -4.80 -1.16 0.37 -1.38 -0.04 
Poland n/a -1.17 -1.20 -0.13 n/a -0.12 0.97 -1.61 0.58 
Portugal n/a 0.17 0.31 -1.41 n/a -0.04 -1.15 n/a -0.91 
Romania 1.58 -1.53 -1.27 0.36 0.42 -3.52 -2.74 -0.98 -0.85 
Russia -2.83 -2.54 -2.12 0.95 -4.51 -0.52 1.24 -1.59 -1.15 
Serbia 0.69 -3.01 -3.92 -3.86 -3.14 -5.43 -2.12 4.83 -3.40 
Slovenia -0.79 -1.48 -0.22 -0.68 -4.38 0.53 0.79 2.03 -1.48 
Spain -1.30 -1.08 -1.33 -0.13 0.81 -1.86 -1.25 -1.84 -1.71 
Sweden -0.51 1.67 0.49 -0.70 -7.00 -0.82 -1.76 -1.49 -0.93 
Switzerland -2.41 1.13 -0.70 -0.55 -2.25 -0.97 0.80 -1.11 -1.27 
Turkey -2.44 -2.44 -2.34 -1.45 -4.26 -3.19 -2.90 1.27 -1.12 
Ukraine -2.88 -2.94 -2.23 -0.19 -2.49 -0.40 -1.19 -2.03 -0.19 
UK -2.12 -0.74 4.37 -1.22 -0.80 -0.08 0.88 -1.01 1.52 
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Continued voting bias 
 Moldova Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russia 
Netherlands -2.51      
Poland -3.70 -0.20     
Portugal n/a -0.23 -1.28    
Romania 2.65 -1.83 0.26 -0.51   
Russia 8.08 -1.62 -2.24 -2.30 -1.56  
Serbia 1.86 -2.34 -2.62 -2.80 -2.43 -2.39 
Slovenia -3.66 -2.13 -0.20 -1.27 -0.07 0.60 
Spain -3.65 -0.15 -1.11 4.96 2.47 -2.06 
Sweden -0.56 -1.74 0.33 -0.79 -1.57 -2.85 
Switzerland -2.68 2.82 n/a n/a -2.54 -1.89 
Netherlands -3.18 -2.30 -1.01 0.12 -1.74 -1.44 
Turkey -2.45 -1.99 -1.99 -2.27 -0.56 -3.13 
Ukraine 2.95 -2.30 3.09 -0.13 -3.06 2.09 
UK -1.66 -1.24 -0.10 -0.64 -1.15 -2.07 
 
Continued voting bias 
 Serbia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
Switzerland The 
Netherlands Turkey Ukraine 
Slovenia 4.13        
Spain -4.09 -0.35       
Sweden -1.82 -0.48 -0.38      
Switzerland 2.03 3.50 0.77 -1.87     
The Netherlands -0.74 1.05 -0.01 -0.85 1.96    
Turkey -5.88 -0.81 -2.51 -0.93 1.82 2.05   
Ukraine -2.89 -1.77 -1.79 -3.76 -2.78 -2.71 -2.82  
United Kingdom -4.01 -1.98 -0.82 -0.72 -1.06 -0.10 0.05 -1.97 
Notes: This table reports the average voting bias for all available pairs of countries in our sample. The voting 
bias was estimated as the votes given on average per pair minus the average votes given by counterpart 
countries. Votes available are 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 12; therefore, the voting bias may vary between -12 
and 12. Note that there are changes to the list of countries that compete from year to year, and therefore the 
number of years used to estimate the average voting bias per pair varies. ‘n/a’ indicates that the particular pair of 
countries never performed in the Eurovision Song Contest in the same year. The sample period was between 
1999 and 2013. 
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Variable definitions 
Variable name Source Definition 
Ln Number of 
Mergers 
Thomson OneBanker 
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of cross-border 
mergers between the two countries  
Voting Bias 
Eurovision Song 
Contest website 
The average vote between each pair of countries minus the average 
vote of the remaining votes available from other countries for the 
particular pair over the sample period 
Cultural Distance - 
Hofstede 
Hofstede website  
 where k is each dimension (i.e. power 
distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-
term orientation, and indulgence) and V is the variance of the 
dimension k 
Cultural Distance – 
Schwartz 
https://www.researchg
ate.net/publication/30
4715744_The_7_Sch
wartz_cultural_value_
orientation_scores_for
_80_countries 
 where k is each dimension (i.e. 
harmony, embeddedness, hierarchy, mastery, affective autonomy, 
intellectual autonomy, and egalitarianism) and V is the variance of 
the dimension k 
Cultural Distance - 
WVS 
World Values Survey 
website 
 
 where k is each dimension (i.e. trust, 
authority, and individualism) and V is the variance of the dimension 
k 
Ln Shared Border 
Distance 
CIA World Factbook 
The natural logarithm of the length of the shared border (if any) 
between two countries 
Ln Capitals Distance CIA World Factbook 
The natural logarithm of the distance in kilometers between the 
capital cities of two countries 
Song Familiarity Google trend website 
A continuous variable measuring the number of years in which 
citizens of at least one country of a dyad exhibited maximum google 
search activity (100) on the counterpart song’s name one day before 
to three days after each competition  
Shared Language CIA World Factbook  
The average percentage of citizens speaking each other’s language in 
a pair 
Shared Religion 
Stulz & Williamson  
(2003) 
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if two countries share a 
primary religion, and zero otherwise  
Shared Legal Origin  CIA World Factbook  
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if two countries share 
legal origin, and zero otherwise  
Shared History 
International 
Historical Statistics 
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if two countries share 
history, and zero otherwise  
Shared Region CIA World Factbook 
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if two countries share 
region (ie central Europe, northern Europe, Middle East), and zero 
otherwise   
Conflicts 
Correlates of War 
(COW) 
A continuous variable that measures the number of conflicts with at 
least one fatality per country pair 
Tax Difference WorldBank 
The distance in the average tax rate per pair of countries during the 
sample period 
Shared Currency Wikipedia 
A dummy variable that takes one if two countries shared a currency 
during the sample period, and zero otherwise  
Ln GDP WorldBank 
The natural logarithm of the average GDP between the two countries 
during the sample period  
Ln GDP Difference WorldBank 
The natural logarithm of the absolute distance of the average GDP 
between the two countries during the sample period 
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Endogeneity mitigation  
To offer some empirical validity on whether endogeneity influences the relation, we followed a 
standard instrumental variable (IV) approach (e.g., Greene, 2008). We used the following 
instrumental variables that are expected to be related with voting bias but not necessarily with the 
number of cross-border mergers. We used a dummy variable (First time) to control for the first year 
that a country participates in the Eurovision Song Contest because lack of experience may affect a 
country’s performance and the voting pattern. Similarly, Won it before, captures whether a country 
has won the competition before. In English, captures whether the song was sung in English. A 
significant percentage of the global population speaks English, and therefore more people may 
understand the content of the songs. More singers, captures whether the song was performed by one 
or more singers. Sequence of song, also captures when the song is performed during the event by 
assigning a value of one if a song appears within the first five or the last five songs, and zero 
otherwise. There is evidence (e.g., Nuechterlein, Parasuraman & Jiang, 1983) that concentration 
levels are relatively high in the early and late stages, and low in between these two stages. Ethnicity, 
also captures ethnic groups who may vote for the song of their country of origin. 
The table below reports the results of instrumental variable estimations. We use yearly data to 
undertake the analysis. In the first step, we regressed our instrumental variables on the voting bias and 
estimated the predicted voting bias. In the second step, we regressed the predicted voting bias that 
arrives from the first stage on the number of cross-border mergers. The results of the first step 
regression shown in column (1) indicate that the coefficients are to an extent as hypothesized above. 
In particular, ethnic groups seem to vote for songs from their home countries. Also, songs from a 
country participating in the Eurovision Song Contest for the first time tend to receive relatively low 
scores. The F-statistic of the regression is larger than ten indicating that the variables are relatively 
good instruments. More importantly, the results of the second-step regression shown in column (2) 
indicate that the relation is unlikely to be the outcome of reverse causality. Voting bias is related 
positively with the number of cross-border mergers. 
 Voting Bias (Annual) Ln Number of Mergers (Annual) 
 First Step Regression 2SLS 
 (1) (2) 
Voting Bias (Annual)   0.155 
   (0.000)    
First Time -2.771   
 (0.000)      
Won It Before 0.121   
 (0.162)      
Hosting -0.193   
 (0.166)      
In English 0.105   
 (0.208)      
More Singers -0.156   
 (0.775)      
Sequence of Song 0.021   
 (0.846)      
Ln Ethnicity 1.248   
 (0.000)      
Constant 0.009 0.711 
 (0.953)    (0.000)    
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Other controls No No 
N 4337 4337 
R-squared Adjusted 0.120 -0.030 
F-Statistic 61.97   
 (0.000)   
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis.   
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